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"The greatness ofa natwn and its moral 
progress can be jUdged by the way its animals 
Lare treated" Mahatma Ghandi (1972) 
Inspired by the resurgence of interest in the nature 
of the relationship between humans and animals dating 
to the publication in 1975 of Victorian philosopher Peter 
Singer's utilitarian-based book, Animal Liberation,l 
there have been significant developments in Australian 
animal welfare law within the last ten years. At the 
Commonwealth level, the Senate Select Committee on 
Animal Welfare was established in 1983, issuing its 
most recent report, on Intensive Livestock Production, 
in June, 1990. The States of New South Wales, Victoria, 
and South Australia have all recently introduced 
complete revisions of their animal cruelty legislation, 
while Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory 
are presently reviewing their existing provisions. 
In the context of this ongoing movement in reform of 
Australian animal welfare law, the rationale underlying 
the existing law needs to be identified to better 
understand what is in the push for what ought to be. 
In the legislative and judicial history of our animal 
welfare law, four considerations have been variously 
identified to explain the existenceand form of those laws: 
1. the "Dominion" rationale; 
2. the Kantian thesis; 
3. the intrinsic value of an animal; 
4. human sentiment. 
1. The "Dominion" Rationale 
Humankind's biblical "dominion" was important 
in the early formulation and construction of animal 
cruelty legislation. 
It has often been suggested that the integration into 
Judaeo-Christian theology ofGreek philosophy served 
to establish that "dominion" as both despotic and 
anthropocentric.2 Nevertheless,legislative and judicial 
consideration of the rationale for animal cruelty 
legislation during the nineteenth century not infrequently 
invoked humankind's biblical "dominion,"3 on occasion 
even citing scripture to this effect.4 That the biblical 
basis of humankind's "dominion" falls short of simple 
despotism over the animal creation seems to have been 
well accepted by both legislature and judiciary 
throughout the nineteenth century. 
Nevertheless, there remained no unanimity in the 
interpretation of what that more humane "dominion" 
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should involve. At one extreme, characterized as 
"responsible dominion,"5 humankind should respect the 
animal creation, though human interests remain trumping 
in any conflict with the welfare of animals. At the other 
extreme, humankind is charged with the responsibility 
of keeping "God's garden" as His "representative on 
earth" allowing of no interference with the animal 
creation in giving effect to human interests.6 
Somewhere between these two extremes would we 
find the appropriate nature of our relations with 
animals. In the history of the animal cruelty laws, 
humankind's biblical "dominion" has never been 
effected by legislation reflective of a philosophy of 
"stewardship" allowing of no interference with the 
animal creation in the fulfillment of human interests. 
It was as against humankind's "cruel and oppressive 
treatment of ... animals" that Lord Erskine invoked 
the obligations of our biblical "stewardship" in the 
preamble to his unsuccessful Bill for "Preventing 
Wanton and Malicious Cruelty to Animals" in 1809.7 
In the interpretation of that notion of "cruelty," the 
animal cruelty laws have inevitably employed the 
concept of "unnecessary" suffering. This has 
legitimated the fulfillment of human interests where 
. such would nevertheless cause suffering to animals 
provided only that that suffering be "necessary" within 
the meaning of the legislation. 
The courts, in invoking humankind's biblical 
"stewardship" to explain the legislation during the 
nineteenth century, were never able to adopt a 
construction of the legislation that it could not bear, 
i.e., that allowed of no interference with the animal 
creation in the expression of human interests. Rather, 
it being clear that "necessary" interference was 
expressly contemplated by the legislation, the courts 
sought to define the content of that "stewardship" 
somewhere further along the spectrum toward 
"responsible dominion." 
While agreed that a "line must be drawn some-
where,"s the courts disagreed about where it should be 
drawn. The religious influence was strongest amongst 
the Irish judiciary. Nevertheless, it was the Irish 
judiciary who construed the legislation as effecting 
merely a "responsible dominion." Human interests were 
perceived as inevitably trumping the welfare ofanimals. 
While "the lower animals are not to be entirely 
subordinated to man"9 they are nevertheless to serve 
human interests in effecting "the objects for which cattle 
were given to man."lO 
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"Responsible dominion," respecting nature but 
subject to the supremacy of human interests in seeking 
"proportion between the object and the means,"ll has 
characterized much of the history of the construction 
of the animal cruelty legislation. Nevertheless, it has 
not inevitably done so. The English judiciary were more 
equivocal than the Irish in invoking theological precepts 
to explain the legislation. They were nevertheless 
unprepared to conclude of any human interest 
(economic or otherwise) that its fulfillment made 
"necessary" any consequent animal suffering. 
Dehorning cattle, for example, legitimated by the Irish 
courts,I2 was found cruel by the English,13 the element 
of commercial profit to the owner being considered 
insufficient to justify the practice. 
Such a philosophy has surfaced in the history of 
legislativel4 and judiciall5 thinking in England. Its 
expression has nevertheless remained merely 
occasional. On the question of dehorning itself, the 
practice, important to the Irish economy, had "for twenty 
years ... been entirely disused throughout England."16 
In Australia, as in Ireland, the practice was one 
important to the economy of a country substantially 
dependent on the activities of its rural sector. It was 
expressly exempted from the operation of the legislation 
in virtually all Australian States (with the exception of 
Victoria, the least rural of the States) in the early 
twentieth century.17 The history of the Australian animal 
cruelty legislation has been to allow that economic 
considerations alone have been sufficient to justify 
otherwise cruel practices. Occasional indications of a 
more enlightened philosophy are today becoming more 
clearly articulated, particularly in relation to the rural 
community and medical experimentation.IS. 
Nevertheless, the rheological justification for human 
consideration of the welfare of animals in terms of 
humankind's biblical "dominion," not infrequently 
invoked legislatively and judicially during the 
nineteenth century, has today fallen from favor: 
"In Australia little or no debate has occurred 
as to the relationship between religion and the 
animal liberation movemem."19 
It is not within the realm of theology that the current 
debates are taking place, nor have they done so during 
the course of the twentieth century. Such debates, 
apparent in the early history of the animal cruelty 
legislation, have appeared in neither legislative nor 
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judicial considerations for nearly a century. It appears 
to have neither legislatively nor judicially any 
perceived role in the further reform of Australian 
animal "entity" law.2o 
2. The Kantian Thesis 
It is to Kant's "escalation" thesis-that cruelty to 
animals brutalizes humans in their attitudes toward 
one another-that legislative and judicial consideration 
of the rationale for animal cruelty legislation has for 
the most part fallen. Although the "demoralization of 
the people" appears in the preamble to the English 
legislation only in 1835,21 the "evident tendency [in 
cruelty] to harden the heart against the natural feelings 
of humanity" had figured, in conjunction with the 
"dominion" rationale, as early as 1809 in Lord 
Erskine's unsuccessful Bill for "preventing Wanton 
and Malicious Cruelty to Animals."22 Popular in 
judicial analyses of the legislation during the 
nineteenth century, but with equivocal support in 
Australian courts in the twentieth, this rationale has 
continued to appear in judicial analyses in the United 
23States even in recent years. Embodied in the 
"doctrine of moral improvement" it has also 
characterized the development of the charitable animal 
welfare trust during the twentieth century, receiving 
expression most recently in Canada.24 
Background LO Kant's Escalation Thesis 
Kant, the German philosopher of the Enlightenment, 
had articulated this thesis in following a tradition begun 
in Greek moral thought and later brought within the 
purview of Western moral thinking by Aquinas. He 
had been led to this thesis in his analysis of rationality 
as the single most important, morally relevant 
characteristic. 
"Rationality" he locates in the capacity for moral 
legislation. That capacity is an end in itself, to be pursued 
through the autonomous act of the individual will. It is 
our function to be rational in all aspects of our lives in 
respecting rationality as an end and not merely as a 
means to an end. Since humans are the only rational 
beings, this leads Kant to his "Categorical Imperative," 
or basic moral law, that you should "[a]ct in such a way 
that you always treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or the person of any other, never simply as a 
means, but always at the same time as an end."25 
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Since "the dog cannot judge:'26 animals being "non-
rational [have] only a relative value as means and are 
consequent!y called things."27 Kant's consideration of 
the value of animals is instrumental. To them "we have 
no direct duties."28 On what basis might we nevertheless 
have indirect duties toward animals? It is this question 
which leads Kant to the formulation of his escalation 
thesis: We must "practice kindness toward animals, 
for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard in his 
dealings with men .... Tender feelings towards dumb 
animals develop human feelings towards mankind."29 
There is empirical evidence supporting the validity 
of this escalation thesis. Studies have suggested that 
"childhood cruelty towards animals may operate as one 
component of a behavioural spectrum associated with 
violence and criminality in adolescence and adult-
hood."3o In combination with persistent enuresis and 
firesetting, "animal cruelty appears to be part of a triad 
in childhood which may be associated with dangerous 
aggression against others at a later age.,,31 Moreover, 
research has suggested a human "tendency to evaluate 
others in light of their interactions with animals,"32 
further supporting in a more general sense the thesis 
that our attitudes toward animals are important in 
shaping our attitudes toward one another.33 
Using the escalation thesis to explain the existence 
of animal cruelty legislation has an obvious appeal to 
those opposed to the notion of the "moral rights" of 
animals. It delimits its justification to the realm of 
merely instrumental considerations toward animals. 
The dilemma with this obvious appeal to explain 
the existence of animal cruelty legislation was early 
exposed by Joseph Ritson, who noted that "those 
accustom'd to eat the brute, should not long abstain 
from the man. "34 If we are to learn from our treatment 
of animals how we should treat people, animal cruelty 
legislation embodying the differential classification 
of animals according only to the economic viability 
of that protection must imply that we may treat 
people similarly. 
The implications for our legal system of such a thesis 
are clearly unacceptable. It would allow that people 
might be treated merely as objects of our property law 
system. There are already elements ofsuch a philosophy 
in our legal system. The services of professional athletes 
(especially football stars) are regularly sold by their 
proprietors. Professional baseball plays in the United 
States (like indentured servants and serfs) had until 
recently no choice in the sale-the reserve clause of 
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their contracts enabling their proprietors unfettered 
freedom in the sale of their services.35 
The differen tial treatment of animals under 
legislation has unpalatable implications quite separate 
from its potential for escalation to the economic 
treatment of human beings. Canadian neurosurgeons 
who had involved themselves in animal experimentation 
during a year's sabbatical were reported to have taken 
quite some time to regain empathy with their patients' 
suffering when they returned to doctoring.36 
Using the escalation thesis to explain our existing 
animal cruelty legislation clearly has implications 
detrimental to the public benefit. Although formulated 
in terms of the "doctrine of moral improvement" in the 
law of charity, it nevertheless finds no support there 
either, human welfare, unlike that of animals, having 
of itself never been considered charitableY The 
community's morals it seems are not thought by the 
courts to be elevated in the same way by diminishing 
cruelty to humans as by diminishing cruelty to animals. 
Nor does it have any appeal in considering the nature 
of the noncharitable purpose trust for a particular 
animal. Under a variant of the "escalation thesis," such 
trusts might be thought to survive on the basis of the 
public benefit in encouraging kindly action toward 
animals. Yet it is the absence of public benefit that 
prevents such trusts being held to be charitable. That 
such trusts are not struck down by the courts cannot find 
its justification in any variant of the escalation thesis. 
While popular in legislative and judicial thinking 
and supported by empirical evidence as to its validity, 
Kant's escalation thesis, as an explanation of the 
rationale underlying animal "entity" law in Australia, 
is substantially inadequate. If applied in the context of 
our existing animal cruelty legislation, it brings with it 
unpalatable implications for our community, and in 
respect of the law as to wills and trusts it cannot be 
applied in any way that forms a coherent explanation 
of the present form of that law. 
3. Intrinsic Value 
There is some judicial support for the view that the 
existing animal welfare law recognizes the intrinsic 
value of an animal. Courts in the United States in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century on occasion found 
in the existence ofanimal cruelty legislation "the theory, 
unknown to the common law, that animals have rights 
which, like those of human beings, are to be 
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protected."38 The legislation was seen as an attempt to 
"recognize and ... protect some abstract rights in all 
that animate creation made subject to man."39 Even in 
recent years, courts in the United States have apparently 
referred to the "moral rights" of animals as, for example, 
in a Memorandum Opinion and Order issued in the 
General Sessions Court at Kingsport. Tennessee, in 
198340 and in Caper's Estate (1964)41 actually quoting 
a passage from Albert Schweitzer's Out of My Life 
and Thought on the ethics of a concern for the sacred 
nature of life. 
In the United States there is also recent legislative 
support for this view, the California Senate resolving 
in 1979 that "the Legislature of the State of California 
should take effective measures to protect and defend 
the rights of animals. ''42 
The intrinsic value of an animal, recognized in these 
occasional ascriptions of "moral rights" in the United 
States, also appears to be recognized in the nature of 
the most recent movements in reform of Australian 
animal welfare law. The Report by the Senate Select 
Committee on Animal Welfare: Animal Experimen-
tation 1989 concludes, having devoted nearly twenty 
pages of its report to the consideration of the moral 
status of animals, that: 
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Through animal cruelty ... legislation, society 
has acknowledged that animals ... have certain 
claims or interests which may be expressed as 
rights, that are afforded protection. When 
rights of animals come into conflict with 
those of humans, the rights of one will 
normally succumb to the other. Although 
humans rights have usually predominated in 
such conflicts, each case should be examined 
on its merits and human rights should not 
automatically prevai1.43 
The Report merely evidences "changing community 
attitudes towards animals"44 in Australia with "an 
increase in the demonstrable concern for all living 
beings."45 That change, under which a moralistic 
outlook on animals is now as popularly held as the 
previously predominant utilitarian perspective,46 has 
seen a British public opinion poll in recent years suggest 
that 9% of the population would even be prepared to 
change their voting habits on the issue of animal 
welfare.47 Despite a limited moralistic and pronounced 
utilitarian outlook toward animals amongst the rural 
community generally,48 a 1981 survey of Australian 
farmers revealed that 87% in fact "recognized that cases 
of cruelty and mistreatment of animals are still 
widespread in agriculture. "49 
This change in attitude appears to be evident in 
recent legislative reform of Australian animal welfare 
law. One purpose of the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals Act 1986 (Vict.) is expressed as the prevention 
of cruelty to animals, without qualification as to an 
instrumental basis for the object.50 While equivocal 
therefore as to the implications of this expressed 
objective, the legislation itself lends support to an 
intrinsic analysis. By that legislation, farmingpractices 
are required to comply with relevant Codes of 
Practice.51 Although challenged as failing to recognize 
the fundamental economic importance of the rural 
community to the State,52 the legislation was passed. 
Regulations introduced in that same year under the 
South Australian legislation prescribed various Codes 
of Practice to operate within the rural sector, recognizing 
as the "basic requirement for the welfare of' animals 
"a husbandry system appropriate to their psychological 
and behavioural needs."53 
In similar terms, the most recent revision of the 
Australian Code of Practice for the Care and Use of 
Animalsfor Scientific Purposes54 imposes the obligation 
to consider the animal's "welfare as an essential 
factor,"55 providing, for example, confinement of the 
animals by means that "ensure [its] comfort and well-
being," taking into account such factors as its natural 
environmental and behavioural requirements.56 
Such refonns are also evident internationally, the 
Animal Protection Act (1988: 534) (Sweden), for 
example, seeking to ensure that both urban and rural 
domestic animals are provided with environments that 
"allow the animals to behave naturally.,,57 
These recent revisions of the law recognize the need 
to make technology meet the needs ofthe animal rather 
than the reverse. In doing so, they appear to give 
legislative force to the theories of those who would 
advocate the intrinsic value of the animal's well-being.58 
The most satisfactorily articulated of these is Bernard 
Rollin's use of the telos of a being, as identifying the 
characteristic giving rise to the possession of "moral 
rights." By it, animals are not measured "according to 
scales that compare them to human beings.',59 Rather, 
it advocates, as the most recent legislative reforms 
appear to do, that we should recognize their own 
biologically determined natures in determining the 
morality of our treatment of them. 
Of course, these legislative reforms, protecting 
animals in terms of their own natural needs, might 
well be explained on purely instrumental grounds. For 
example, the recognition of their natural needs may 
make us more likely to recognize the needs ofmembers 
of our own communities. However instrumentally 
justified though, this type of reform is an answer to 
the unpalatable consequences identified in the 
application of Kant's escalation thesis to the more 
traditional form of animal cruelty legislation and is, 
in any event, consistent with the type of reform 
advocated by many of those philosophers who have 
sought the moral consideration of animals for their 
own sakes. On the other hand, this legislation may 
well be construed as a far-sighted attempt to recognize 
the natural needs of animals as morally considerable 
in their own right and in the absence of purely 
instrumental considerations. 
The natural needs of animals have been the focus of 
little attention historically in either the drafting or 
subsequent judicial construction of our animal welfare 
laws. While animal cruelty legislation has on occasion 
acknowledged "the duty of every person having the care 
or charge of any animal to take all reasonable steps to 
ensure [its] well-being,"60 the recognition of that duty 
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has been dependent upon the ambit attributed to 
"necessity" in the construction of the animal suffering 
permitted by the legislation. 
Dependency from Domestication 
A theory, although advanced in advocation of 
reform, which serves well in explaining the established 
form of the animal "entity" laws is that which grounds 
the intrinsic value of animals in their dependency from 
domestication.61 
Whether animals have been domesticated as pets, 
servants, sources of food and clothing, or as human 
surrogates in experimental research, their social need 
to belong to a group has remained a fundamental 
biological imperative.62 We have simply shifted that 
bond of social dependence to the animal's owner. It is 
"[t]hrough this exploitation of the animal's own drive 
to belong [that] there emerges a relationship with the 
proprietor that is qualitatively different from the mere 
owner-owned relationship."63 
Having been "brought directly into the human social 
unit," it has been suggested that we "would seem to 
have no alternative but to treat it as a functioning 
. member of that social unit,"64 to be ascribed rights in 
the same manner as in the case of "marginal humans." 
In both instances the recipient of those rights is a 
powerless member of our community whose interests 
are to be protected against the exploitation of the more 
powerful. The view that domestication is a morally 
relevant factor in conferring moral standing on animals 
has been considered to be "sufficiently persuasive to 
be worth more investigation."65 
Such a theory might rationalize even the existing 
law in terms of the intrinsic value of animals. If wild, 
there being no acquired moral status from domestication, 
the animal has no "moral rights" whatever protections 
may be instrumentally justified.66 Its case for moral 
consideration is the stronger the greater its dependency 
from the fact of its domestication. While wild animals 
benefit from merely negative obligations of 
noninterference under the animal cruelty legislation, 
affirmative obligations toward their animals are 
additionally imposed on the owners of domesticated 
animals. Those obligations are greater in the case of 
companion animals, most dependent on their owners 
for their welfare, then in the case of merely rurally 
domesticated animals. The recognition of the 
noncharitable purpose trust has similarly arisen only in 
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the context of companion animals, its operation more 
broadly being highly questionable. 
Nevertheless, the theory that moral status should 
arise in the context of domestication has been advocated 
in justification of reform of the existing law. Its 
proponents would not, for example, see in its tenns 
justification for the general exemption of "accepted 
farming practices" from the operation of the animal 
cruelty laws, a position which has historically 
characterized the legislation of the Australian States. 
Nor does it explain the position of experimental 
animals within the legislation, historically granted 
limited protections while completely dependent as a 
result of domestication. 
4. Human Sentiment 
While the most recent reforms in Australian 
animal welfare law may be suggestive of a recog-
nition of intrinsic value as inhering in animals, 
carrying with it "moral rights" to the recognition of 
biologically determined natural needs, no similar 
account seems adequate to explain the traditional 
form of our animal "entity" laws. In explanation of 
their underlying rationale, instrumental rather than 
intrinsic considerations seem evident. Nevertheless, 
we have identified no clearly authoritative account of 
that instrumental explanation. 
In humankind's affections for animals, Aquinas 
identified either reason or sentiment at their base.67 
Reason. expressed in the Kantian escalation thesis,68 
has failed to explain our legal expression of those 
affections. While contemporary moral philosophy 
strongly favors rationalistic theories, sentiment· has 
figured prominently in the judicial analyses of animal 
cruelty and wills and trusts laws. 
Sentiment has appeared in courts in Scotland, the 
United States, and South Africa in the analysis ofanimal 
cruelty legislation.69 In courts in both Australia and 
England, it has been mooted in explanation of the 
anomalous recognition of the noncharitable purpose 
trust,70 and in the United States sentiment has featured 
in the judicial construction accorded both testamentary 
pet destruction provisions7l and in the award ofdamages 
for wrongful destruction of an animal.72 When in Smith 
v Avanzino73 more than 3000 letters were received by 
the court in expressing a "well-defined and universal 
sentiment"74 that the public looked with "disfavour ... 
[upon] the decree that the decedent had for her dog,"75 
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a special statute was even enacted, rushed through the 
California legislature in order to save the dog's life.76 
Sentiment has the merit of providing a coherent 
explanation of the form of the existing animal "entity" 
laws. The differential protection of animals embodied 
in the legislation appears to be directly proportionate 
to the strength of the human/companion animal bond. 
Those animals that perform a companion role as human 
pelS and with which we form our closest emotional 
attachments are those which have received the most 
extensive protection under animal cruelty legislation. 
Specific exemptions have operated in relation to our 
activities with respect to food and research animals, our 
relations with these animals not being characterized by 
the same personal and familial ties that characterize the 
human/companion animal bond and for whom no 
clearly defined public sentiment analogous to that 
arising from that bond exists. The philosophy 
underlying our animal "entity" laws appears best 
described as based merely on human sentiment, laws 
"intended ... to save ... people ofcommon good feeling, 
the pain of witnessing [animal] sufferings."77 
A justification of such laws based on human 
sensibilities, while adequate to explain the French "Loi 
Grammont," has been argued to be inadequate to explain 
the prevention of even private and unobserved cruelty 
to an animal under our own legislation.78 However, 
one's sensibilities are perhaps no less offended by the 
knowledge of the occurrence of such private activities 
then they are by the witnessing of them. Professor Louis 
Schwartz, one of the architects of the United States 
Model Penal Code, has identified sentiment as the 
rationale behind the legislation: 
Our concern is for the feelings of other human 
beings, a large proportion of whom, although 
accustomed to the slaughter of animals for 
food, readily identify themselves with a 
tortured dog or horse and respond with great 
sensitivity to its sufferings.79 
While a utilitarian attitude of valuing animals in 
terms merely of their practical and material value has 
characterized twentieth century perceptions of 
animals,8o the humanistic perspective of a strong 
affection for animals has become predominant in more 
recent years. The most common attitude toward 
animals among children81 and young adults82 is a 
humanistic perception of animals that has become far 
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more prevalent in urban environments than the 
utilitarian attitude, partiCUlarly in recent years.83 A 
study in the United States suggests that two-thirds of 
the American population have owned pets "as dear to 
them as another person."84 In rural environments, on 
the other hand, where the human/companion animal 
bond does not characterize the attitudes of owners 
toward their stock, farmers are still highly utilitarian 
in their outlook on animals.8s 
Sentimental affections toward animals have 
achieved a prominence in current community attitudes 
toward animals. They are both sufficient to explain the 
existing form of animal "entity" law and are not 
infrequently advanced by the courts to explain its 
underlying rationale. What place have such sentimental 
affections in our moral system? 
Sentimentalism has recently been described as 
having "no very clear shared sense either in current 
moral theory or in the history of ethics."86 Appeals to 
sentiment have often been avoided by philosophers in 
the animal welfare debate, fearing criticism of their 
writing as purely emotive and not worthy of serious 
consideration.87 
Nevertheless, in recent philosophical writings 
(particularly in the context of the animal welfare debate) 
there has been a resurgence of interest in the place of 
sentiment in a moral system.88 Discussion of the subject 
has centered on the writings of such as Shaftesbury, 
Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith. Each sought to anchor 
moral motivation and justification not in reason but in 
an appeal to emotions, desires, and sentiments. 
One difficulty in interpreting their writings derives 
from variation in the meaning to be attributed to 
terminologies they used. In their use of "sympathy," 
for example, neither Hume nor Smith employed the term 
in its generally accepted modem sense, our feeling of 
compassion or pity for the suffering of another.89 For 
Hume, it is more than the mere sense of "compassion" 
or "pity," being closer in meaning to empathy, actually 
understanding the feelings of another whatever be our 
own feelings in the matter.90 It is a matter of shared 
feelings, a sense of feeling with another. 
In Smith's writings, not even this accurately 
characterizes his use of "sympathy." He argues that 
more must be involved than merely the emotionally 
neutral reception of that other's feelings, for otherwise 
there could never then be an absence of sympathy upon 
which to base judgments of disapproval. Rather, my 
sympathies derive from an enlivening association of 
Between the Species 
Animal Welfare Law: Foundations/or Re/orm 
my own sympathetic feelings with the feelings of the 
other. The coincidence of our sentiments is brought 
about by my capacity to sympathize with another 
through imaginary change of position, conceiving 
myself to be in that other's position and comparing 
with my own sympathetic feelings the real feelings of 
that other.91 
Nor does either Smith or Hume see sympathy as 
sentiment. For Hume, the idea of a sentiment is "so 
enlivened [through the mechanism of sympathy] as to 
become the very sentimem."92 For Smith, sympathy is 
merely the correspondence between sentiments ofpity, 
compassion, or sorroW.93 
Their concepts of sympathy and sentiment fail to 
accord with the more usually understood meanings of 
the terms, even in their own day. It is therefore difficult 
to context within the sentimentalist framework the many 
and various judicial references to sympathy94 and 
sentiment95 to explain the animal "entity" laws. 
Nevertheless, both Hume and Smith discussed 
animal sympathy in developing their theories. Since 
for Hume good and evil are not simply "matters offact" 
but are to be found in one's "own breast," the evil of an 
action arises purely because "from the constitution of 
your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame 
from the contemplation of it."96 Decrying the 
rationalists of the European Continent, David Hume 
brought the empirical philosophies of Locke and 
Berkeley to their logical conclusions. Animal suffering 
was self-evident, and its evil lay in the sentiment evoked 
from its contemplation. While Hume did not consider 
that we are called on to act justly toward animals, he 
concluded thal we "should be bound by the laws of 
humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures."97 
Similarly for Smith animals were not only the causes 
of pleasure and pain but also capable of feeling those 
sensations.98 They are, therefore, "less improper objects 
of gratitude and resentment than inanimated objects,"99 
though still far from being complete and perfect objects 
of those passions. For this, they would need to be 
capable not only of producing sensations of pleasure 
and pain but also of doing so from design.lOo As regards 
animals, therefore, Smith concludes that our passions 
ofgralitude and resentment, while presenl, nevertheless 
"still feel that there is something wanting to their entire 
gratification."IOJ 
Animals are, therefore, for both Hume and Smith, 
at least in some sense, proper objects of sentimental 
concern. It is in this sense perhaps that the courts have 
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perceived in animal cruelty legislation its usefulness in 
"elevating humanity by enlargement of its sympathy 
with all God's creatures."l02 
In what degree our sentiments are legitimately 
motivated by our sentimental concern for the welfare 
of animals has been the subject of recent philosophical 
writings. The American philosopher, Steve Sapontzis, 
has acknowledged the argument (in responding to it) 
that in community life, "[w]e are not only permitted 
but even obligated to give priority to the interests of 
our families, friends, colleagues and compatriots ... a 
world from which these non-egalitarian commitments 
were abolished would not be enhanced but be 
impoverished."l03 On this view, "speciesist tendencies 
... are [actually] consequences ... of moral excellence. 
The fact that we can find no reason for speciesism 
when we consider the consequences, or the morally 
relevant characteristics of animal vis-a-vis some 
humans, is irrelevant."l04 
In responding to this claim, Sapontzis notes that "in 
addition to relational rights and responsibilities, 
common morality also contains egalitarian rights and 
responsibilities."105 Our legal system is cautious in the 
delimitation of the moral boundary between legitimate 
nepotism and simple prejudice. Racial and sex 
discrimination legislation is perhaps the most obvious 
example of the requirement of equal consideration of 
interests in our society. 
Moreover, these boundaries are not drawn along 
lines requiring the reciprocation of the rights accorded, 
since they are clearly directed to the protection of the 
"powerless" in their dealings with the "powerful."lll6 
Therequiremem ofdisclosure by the potentially insured 
to the insurer of all material factslO7 is an illustration 
from the law of contract of a right possessed by one 
party to a contract to protect its weaker interests against 
those of the more powerful party.108 
Animals, if, at least in some measure, properly the 
objects of our sentimental concerns, are similarly 
powerless members of our community whose interests 
should be protected against the exploitation of the more 
powerful. It is in our capacity to "imaginatively 
sympathize"l09 with their position that Smith would 
make this moral judgment. 
The extent of that protection from exploitation 
though is logically dependent on the extent to which 
our sympathies exist. Smith himselfconcludes animals 
to be far from being complete and proper objects of our 
passions of gratitude and resentment. 110 A familiar 
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criticism of the sentimentalist account of moral 
judgment has been the difficulty of moving from a study 
of contingent human desires to posit appropriate 
standards of human conduct.ll1 Moral considerations 
appear to be left to depend on desires and attitudes to 
which each individual mayor may not in fact be subject. 
The sentimentalist does seek both a universality and 
objectivity in moral judgment. I12 Hume, for example, 
argued that moral sentiments were both natural and 
uni versally distributed. 1l3 That they are fixed 
psychological characteristics of human nature derives 
support from Darwinian evolutionary theory.u4 The 
"all-important emotion of sy mpathy"11 5 is an adaptive 
evolutionary feature; a "feeling ... [which] will have 
been increased through natural selection; for those 
communities, which included the greatest number of 
sympathetic members, would flourish best, and rear the 
greatest number of offspring."116 
Equally difficult to defend is the charge of 
anthropomorphism in the expression of our natural 
concerns for the welfare of animals. I I? Our sympathy 
is stimulated because we assume the animal to be like 
ourselves, and in this we fail to recognize the animal's 
telos: its own nature. In feeling sympathy for the animal 
we are incorrectly projecting our own human 
psychology and physiology onto the animal. 
While our expanding understanding of the 
physiology and psychology of the animal kingdom 
increasingly diminishes the strength of this case, it 
nevertheless serves to highlight the contention that a 
sentimentalist account of moral judgment accords no 
intrinsic value to the animal. 
The sentimentalist basis for moral judgment 
concerning animals appears to be purely instrumental. I I g 
Not only does the argument for its contingent nature 
apparently remove it from the realm of intrinsic 
considerations, its derivation from the anthropomorphic 
projection of our own feelings onto animals in the 
definition of our sympathies firmly suggests its 
foundation in merely instrumental considerations. 
Legislation protecting the welfare of animals is merely 
a means to our own ends, protecting our own 
sensitivities and sensibilities. It is certainly in this sense 
that the courts have understood the nature of our 
sentimental concern for animals. 
The sentimentalist account of the animal "entity" 
laws, apparent in the judicial analyses of their 
existence, is not only satisfactory for explaining the 
form that that law has assumed, it also serves to 
rationalize its existence without recourse to the notion 
of the intrinsic value of an animal, so contentious in 
the "animal rights" debate. 
In the historical growth and present form of our 
animal "entity" laws, sentiment has been given 
significant expression. If the present movement in 
reform of Australian welfare law should occur 
exclusively in the context of contemporary ration-
alistic philosophy, this would be to ignore a most 
significant aspect of the heritage of our existing law 
and its inspiration. 
The author is Barrister of the High Court of 
Australia and formerly a member of the Faculty 
of Law, The Australian National University. 
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